This paper presents a DGE model in which aggregate price level inertia is generated endogenously by the optimizing behaviour of price setting …rms. All the usual sources of inertia are absent here ie., all …rms are simultaneously free to change their price once every period and face no adjustment costs in doing so. Despite this, the model generates persistent movements in aggregate output and in ‡ation in response to a nominal shock. Two modi…cations of a standard onequarter pre-set price model deliver these results: learning-by-doing and habit formation in leisure.
Introduction
There has been a recent surge in interest in dynamic general equilibrium models in which …rms adjust their prices infrequently. Many of these models employ one of two classes of time-dependent pricing rules associated with Taylor (1999) and Calvo (1983) . 1 In the former, prices are set for a given number of periods and the opportunity to adjust prices is staggered so that not all …rms can adjust prices in any given period. In the latter, …rms face a …xed probability of being able to adjust prices in each period. While the duration for which prices are …xed is uncertain for an individual …rm, the average duration is known and in the aggregate a constant fraction of all …rms will adjust prices every period as in the Taylor model. 2 While these models have had some success in generating empirically plausible business cycles in response to monetary shocks the pricing arrangements embedded in the models are theoretically unappealing. 3 This theoretical weakness arises from the exogenous nature of the pricing arrangements imposed upon …rms which determine both the length of time for which prices cannot be re-optimized as well as the degree of synchronization among …rms. This can have important consequences for the ability of these models to predict the response of the economy to changes in the economic environment, especially to changes in monetary policy. While one might expect that the optimal pricing arrangements of …rms may respond to policy, they cannot in the model. Since the duration of price stickiness and the degree of staggering of pricing decisions in ‡uence the response of aggregate variables in the model one may not end up with sensible predictions regarding how the economy will respond to these changes.
Staggered price setting models were popular despite this well understood weakness because staggering was viewed as a critical element, along with long periods of price stickiness, in generating an inertial response of the price level and aggregate output to monetary shocks. However recent work has questioned the centrality of these two phenomena in propagating nominal shocks. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) forcefully argue that staggering 1 There are too many sticky price dynamic general equilibrium models to list here. Some examples are King and Watson (1996) , Yun (1996) , Cho et al (1997) , Chari et al. (2000) , Bergin and Feenstra (2000) , Erceg et al. (2000) and Huang and Liu (2001 of pricing decisions is ine¤ective in propagating output beyond the assumed duration for which prices are …xed. In addition, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) show that price staggering is not crucial to generating realistic impulse responses. Finally Bils and Klenow (2004) show that on average prices change much more quickly in US data than has been assumed in the sticky price literature. 4 The goal of this paper is to show that it is not necessary to retain either unappealing element in order to generate inertia not only in output but also in the aggregate price level. To make this point forcefully, the paper restricts the amount of exogenous price rigidity to one period, i.e., all …rms set prices simultaneously at the beginning of each period. None the less, the aggregate price level will adjust slowly to a money growth shock because all …rms optimally choose to adjust their prices slowly 5 . In the standard oneperiod sticky price model, …rms wish to adjust prices in proportion with the expected change in marginal costs next period. One way to slow down the adjustment of prices is to introduce mechanisms that prevent marginal costs from rising too fast. The other way is for …rms to actually choose to adjust prices less than proportionally to expected marginal cost. In other words, …rms must change their markup. This paper incorporates both of the above features. 6 As a result the model can generate prices that adjust very slowly. Since the …rm could in principle adjust fully to expected future in ‡ation after the …rst period, any subsequent sluggishness seen in the impulse response of prices is endogenous. Indeed, in the standard one period sticky price model, almost all of the adjustment in a …rm's price occurs in the …rst period after the shock.
The paper uses two mechanisms that build upon each other to quantitatively generate realistic persistence in in ‡ation and output. The …rst mechanism modi…es the technological environment in which …rms operate by introducing learning-by-doing. 7 The second mechanism modi…es consumers preferences by introducing habit formation in leisure. I discuss them in turn.
Learning-by-doing in ‡uences price inertia in two ways by providing a dynamic link between current production and future productivity. The basic mechanism is quite intiutive. As …rms raise output to meet the increase in demand that follows an expansion of the money supply, they accumulate production knowledge which lowers future costs. In the periods after the shock, when …rms are free to set prices, they face lower marginal costs and thus set lower prices as compared to an environment without learning-bydoing. In addition to this a more subtle mechanism may be in operation…rms may actually choose to lower their markup over marginal cost. This occurs because …rms face a trade-o¤ between increasing current revenue and reducing future marginal costs. As a result, …rms use prices to control how much they learn in any given period depending on the marginal value of that learning to the …rm. To see this, consider a …rm that desires to reduce future costs via learning-by-doing. To do this, it must increase output. Given demand, in a monopolistically competitive environment, the …rm must lower its price in order to sell this extra output. 8 This has two implications for the model. First, …rms will set lower prices compared to standard models in which this dynamic trade-o¤ is absent. In other words the steady state markup charged by …rms is lower. Second, this markup will respond to shocks that shift the demand for the …rm's product, such as a money growth shock.
Consider an increase in the growth rate of money which leads to an increase in the demand for a …rm's product. This creates a favorable environment for learning because the demand curve is more responsive to a cut in price than in steady state. Essentially, a unit reduction in price yields more learning bang for the buck by generating more production and greater future cost reductions as compared to a similar price reduction in steady state. If the marginal value of learning is high for a …rm, this mechanism makes it want to lower the markup it charges over marginal cost relative to steady state. 9 When combined with the reductions in marginal cost induced by learning-by-doing, the lower markups can be a potent mechanism for generating price inertia.
Learning-by-doing also acts as a real propagation mechanism. The short 8 I am abstracting from the possibility of inventories. Obviously a …rm could, for a limited amount of time, produce output and store it rather than reduce price now. Given storage costs, this output must eventually be sold, lowering prices at that time. 9 The converse is also true. If the marginal value of learning is low (perhaps because of high production in the recent past), the markup may be raised.
lived increases in output generated by a standard sticky price model in response to an unexpected increase in the growth rate of money are converted into long lived increases due to the fact that productivity is above steady state for a number of periods.
The other mechanism that contributes to the inertial response of the model is the presence of habit formation in the utility function with regards to the desire for leisure. Habits in leisure imply that consumers utiltity today depends not only on the current level of leisure but also past levels. Due to habit formation, high levels of leisure in the past lead to an increased desire for leisure in the present, other things being constant. To see how this might generate an inertial response in hours and output, consider the response of hours in a sticky price model in the absence of habit formation. A one time fall in the growth rate of money, leads to a reduced demand for output leading to a sharp increase in leisure as …rms cut production in the impact period. The next period, prices fall and money balances are restored almost to steady state levels. As a result, output, hours and leisure revert to virtually steady state levels. When consumers form habits, the desire for leisure rises as re ‡ected in a rise in the marginal utility of leisure in the second period. As a result, they are reluctant to return immediately to steady state levels of leisure and accordingly hours stay below steady state for a number of periods. This inertial response of hours also generates more ouput persistence which in turn leads to in ‡ation persistence.
The e¤ectiveness of these two mechanisms in generating quantitatively realistic levels of inertia in output and the aggregate price level is evaluated in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model with real money balances in preferences. Prices, in this model, are preset for one period only. Simulations from a linearized version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, show that the model is capable of generating inertia in the aggregate price level as well as in output that is close to that observed in the aggregate US data. The …rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of detrended output and in ‡ation in US data is .93 and .82 respectively. The benchmark version of the model with neither habits nor learning-by-doing generates .013 and .015 respectively. The full model with both mechanisms built in delivers .71 and .81 respectively.
As far as I am aware there are no previous studies of closed economy business cycles that incorporate learning-by-doing into monetary dynamic general equilibrium models. 10 However, Cooper and Johri (2002) , show that learning-by-doing is extremely e¤ective at propagating technology shocks in a real business cycle framework. Cooper and Johri use a representative agent framework and are agnostic about the issue of who actually learns from past production: workers or …rms, and thus o¤er no account of possible decentralizations. In complementary work, Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002) focus solely on learning that is embodied in workers and is fully captured in wages. They estimate the aggregate learning rate for the US using data from the PSID and incorporate this into a dynamic general equilibrium model with real shocks. They too are able to generate a persistent response of output to real shocks.
There is similarly little work on habit formation in leisure in the context of dynamic general equilibrium models with money shocks. An example is Yun (1996) . Bouakez and Kano (2006) and Wen (1998) use habit formation in leisure in the context of a real business cycle model. Unlike Yun, in both papers, the stock of habit is formed based on a long lived distributed lag over past levels of leisure (or hours).
The next section presents the model and discusses the two mechanisms in more detail. Section 3 discusses the calibration of key parameters, section 4 presents some analytical and simulation results. The …nal section concludes.
The Model
This section describes a monetary economy populated by many identical, in…nitely lived consumers. Each period, the economy …nds itself in one of …nitely many states, s t : Let s t = (s 0 ;:::; s t ) be the history of these states of the world. Along with labour and a good that is used both for consumption and investment, the commodities in the economy are money, a continuum of intermediate goods, and organizational capital.
There are a large number of …nal good producers who behave competitively and use the following technology for converting intermediate goods 10 The closest models, Tsuruga (2007) and Cook(1999) , incorporate dynamic production externalities to propagate monetary shocks. Cooper and Johri (1997) discuss how these externalities may be interpreted as learning e¤ects. Unlike the current model, these dynamic externalities do not generate endogenous markup movements. While potentially very important, externalities are ignored in this paper to focus on the impact of internal learning-by-doing on pricing decisions.
indexed by i 2 [0; 1] into …nal goods.
Each period they choose inputs Y i (s t ) for all i 2 [0; 1]; and output Y (s t ) to maximize pro…ts given by
subject to (1) where P (s t ) denotes the price of the …nal good at history s t ;while P i (s t 1 ) is the price paid for the ith intermediate good in period t. Note that these prices are set before the realization of the period t shock. The solution to this problem gives us the input demand functions:
The zero pro…t condition can be used to infer the level of …nal goods prices from the intermediate good prices:
There are a large number of intermediate goods producers, indexed by the letter i who operate in a Dixit-Stiglitz style imperfectly competitive economy. Each of these produces intermediate goods with a technology given by F(.) which is increasing in all inputs : Y i (sthe more productive the …rm. Learning-by-doing leads to the accumulation of organizational capital which depends on output and the current stock of organizational capital:
All producers begin life with a positive and identical endowment of organizational capital. I assume 0 < < 1and 0 < 1: While learning-by-doing is often associated with workers and modeled as the accumulation of human capital, a number of economists have argued that …rms are also store-houses of knowledge. Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) note "At least as far back as Marshall (1930, bk.iv, chap. 13.I), economists have argued that organizations store and accumulate knowledge that a¤ects their technology of production. This accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured capital distinct from the concepts of physical or human capital in the standard growth model." Similarly Lev & Radharkrishnan (2003) write, "Organization capital is thus an agglomeration of technologies-business practices, processes and designs, including incentive and compensation systems-that enable some …rms to consistently extract out of a given level of resources a higher level of product and at lower cost than other …rms." There are at least two ways to think about what constitutes organizational capital. Some, like Rosen (1972) , think of it as a …rm speci…c capital good while others focus on speci…c knowledge embodied in the matches between workers and tasks within the …rm. While these di¤erences are important, especially when trying to measure the payments associated with various inputs, they are not crucial to the issues at hand. As a result I do not distinguish between the two.
This speci…cation of how learning-by-doing leads to productivity increases draws on early work by Arrow(1962) and Rosen(1972) (2002) which not only o¤ers a detailed justi…cation for the modelling assumptions but also a number of estimates of the learning technology at di¤erent levels of aggregation for the US economy.
The crucial di¤erence between the traditional speci…cation of learning-by-doing and this one is that it allows for curvature in the accumulation of knowledge. The traditional speci…cation assumes that organizational capital at time t equals the cumulative sum of all output ever produced by the …rm. Thus it may be written as
whereas the speci…cation used in Cooper and Johri may be written in logs as
This modi…cation of the traditional speci…cation of learning has a number of advantages. First, it allows for the sensible idea that production knowledge may become less and less relevant over time as new techniques of production, new product lines and new markets emerge. Second, it allows in a general way for the idea that some match speci…c knowledge may be lost to the …rm as workers leave or get reassigned to new tasks or teams within the …rm. In addition, the knowledge accumulated through production experience will be a function of the current vintage of physical capital. The decision to replace physical capital will imply that the existing stock of organizational capital will be less relevant. Third, it allows for the existence of a steady state in which the stock of organizational capital is constant. In contrast, the traditional speci…cation in the empirical learning-by-doing literature allows the stock of organizational capital to grow unboundedly. An alternative way to bound learning is to assume that productivity increases due to learning occur for a …xed number of periods. While this may be appropriate for any one task or worker within the …rm, we think of the internal context of …rms as an environment with an ever changing set of tasks, workers, teams, machines and information. In this context it may be better to model organizational capital as continually accumulating and depreciating.
The restriction < 1 is consistent with the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of depreciation of organizational capital often referred to as organizational forgetting. Argote et al. (1990) provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis of organizational forgetting associated with the construction of Liberty Ships during World War II. Similarly, Darr et al. (1995) provide evidence for this hypothesis for pizza franchises and Benkard (2000) provides evidence for organizational forgetting associated with the production of commercial aircraft. One di¤erence between these studies and this paper is that the accumulation technology is log-linear rather than linear. Clarke (2006) shows that the additional curvature in this log-linear technology is unlikely to produce predictions for aggregate variables, in response to a technology shock, considerably di¤erent to those associated with a linear technology. It is the implied dynamic structure associated with the accumulation of organizational capital, rather than any functional form assumptions that drives the results in Cooper and Johri (2002) . Similar results should follow in the current context.
Each intermediate goods producer faces a downward sloping demand function for his product (3) which comes from the pro…t maximization problem of the …nal goods producers discussed above. Prices are set by all producers at the beginning of each period before the realization of the event s
The solution to this minimization problem implies
and
from which the input demands can be obtained. Substituting these into (9) yields the cost function: Taking V i (s t ) as given, the solution to the maximization problem above implies two …rst order conditions:
where F (s t ) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the organizational capital accumulation equation once (3) has been used to substitute out for
The latter …rst order condition determines the optimal level of prices to be set by the producer. Note that the state has been suppressed in this equation except where it is needed to avoid confusion. Raising prices by one unit causes output to fall since producers face downward sloping demand curves for their product. The …rst term captures the net impact on current revenue of the higher price but lower output, while the second term represents the current cost savings from producing less. The third term appears because the producer realizes that he faces a forward looking problem due to learning by doing. The accumulation equation for organizational capital implies that a reduction of current period output will lead to a reduction in organizational capital available tomorrow. The third term captures the value of this organizational capital lost to the …rm and is made up of three parts. The term (
represents the reduction in output due to the higher price, while 0 Y (H it ; Y it ) represents the reduction in H it+1 due to the reduction in output which must be evaluated at F t ; the marginal value of organizational capital to the …rm.
Equation (13) determines the value of having available an additional unit of organizational capital for use by the …rm in the following period. First, the additional organizational capital improves pro…ts by reducing costs, as captured by the second term on the right hand side (recall V 0 Hit+1 is negative). Second, it adds to the ability of the organization to learn from production thus raising future organizational capital. This additional organizational capital has a value of F t+1 for the …rm. All this must be discounted by the price of one dollar in period t+1 in units of period t dollars. Alternatively one could say that the …rm sets prices so that the value of accumulating an additional unit of organizational capital today is just equal to the discounted value of organizational capital tomorrow.
The intuition in (13) and (14) suggests that …rms face a trade-o¤ between current pro…ts and future pro…ts which is not present in the traditional price setting problem. Charging a higher price today lowers the amount of organizational capital available tomorrow which raises future costs and lowers future pro…ts. As a result, …rms will optimally select a lower price in the presence of learning by doing than they would otherwise set. This can be seen by re-writing (14) as
and noting that the second term appears only when the learning-by-doing mechanism is present. Note that each intermediate good …rm earns positive pro…ts even in the presence of a constant returns to scale technology due to the accumulation of organizational capital. However there is no entry or exit in this industry by assumption.
Consumers
The economy is populated by a large number of identical consumers whose preferences are de…ned over consumption of …nal goods (C(s t )), leisure (L(s t )) and real money balances (M (s t )=P (s t )). The preference speci…cation below allows for endogenous habit formation with b 0 being the parameter which determines the degree of habit persistence. These preferences reduce to the standard speci…cation with no habits for b = 0. Each consumer maximizes the sum of discounted expected utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints (given below) by choosing the optimal quantity of these goods to consume, the amount of hours to work and how much to invest x(s t )in physical capital (K(s t )) and one-period nominal bonds B(s t+1 ) each period. They take as given prices (P (s t )), wages (w(s t ) ) and interest rates (r(s t ) ). If 0 < < 1 is the discount factor, then the household's problem is to maximize
subject to the sequence of budget constraints: 
While these adjustment costs are a real resource cost for the economy, since investment equals depreciation in steady state, no adjustment costs are incurred in steady state.
In addition to the above constraints, we need the sequence of borrowing constraints B(s t+1 ) B u for some large negative value of B u : The …rst-order conditions for optimality are given by
where U j (s i ) denotes the derivative of U with respect to variable j evaluated in state s i . Note that
The interpretation of these …rst order conditions is quite standard. Equation (20) gives the optimal labor-leisure choice. The presence of habits adds a second term on the right hand side and introduces dynamics into the decision. An extra unit of leisure today generates not only some positive current marginal utility but it also raises the desire for leisure tomorrow by increasing the marginal utility of leisure tomorrow. (21) is the optimality condition determining money demand. It states that the consumer should choose to save nominal balances to the point that the current net bene…t of saving an additional dollar (which is made up of the marginal utility lost due to lower current consumption minus the marginal utility gained due to higher money balances) is just equal to the discounted expected bene…t next period( composed of the marginal utility of the extra consumption that can be bought next period which in turn depends on the expected value of in ‡ation over this interval). Equation (22) is the equation which determines optimal bond holdings while equation (23) is the optimality condition for capital accumulation. This condition looks slightly di¤erent from the standard intertemporal euler equation due to the presence of adjustment costs. Since v 0, at the optimum, the household endogeneizes the fact that one unit of foregone consumption today produces only 1 v
units of capital tomorrow.
Also, note that (s t+1 j s t ) = (s t+1 )= (s t ) is the probability of state s t+1 conditional on state s t having been realized. The nominal money supply process is
where (s t ) is a stochastic process. Consumers receive lump sum transfers of new money balances which satisfy:
In addition to these …rst order conditions from the consumer and …rm problem we have market clearing conditions which require that the total stock of capital supplied by consumers is equal to the sum of capital rented by all intermediate goods …rms. Similarly the total hours of labor supplied by consumers should equal the sum of labor hours demanded by all intermediate goods …rms. Recall that while prices are chosen by …rms before uncertainty about shocks is resolved, factor demands are chosen afterwards. Bond market clearing requires that B(s t+1 ) = 0:The resource constraint for the economy is C(s
Computation method and calibration
The model is solved using the method outlined in King and Watson (2002) using a linear approximation to the system of equations including the …rst order conditions of the intermediate goods producers problem, the …rst order conditions from the consumers problem, the production function, the resource constraint for the economy and the accumulation equation for physical and organizational capital. Some variables are growing in steady state -they are rendered stationary by dividing by the stock of money in the economy. In order to simulate the economy, functional forms have to be speci…ed. With the exception of the presence of habit formation in leisure, the speci…-cation for preferences is similar to Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000):
Here L t = L t bL t 1 and b governs the extent to which habits are formed. A number of estimates of b are available in the literature ranging from a high of roughly 0:8 in Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) to a low around 0:5 in Braun and Evans (1998). For the baseline calibration, I picked the midpoint value of b=.65. Sensitivity analysis with b=.5 is also provided. Other parameters related to preferences are taken from Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000). I set ! = :94; and = :39 and set so that the fraction of the time endowment spent on working in steady state is :3. The typical value for ; in the literature is unity. However, non-separability in leisure contributes to generating in ‡ation inertia. In order to stay close to unity and yet allow for non-separability I set = 1:1: This value of sigma was used for all models with habits in leisure including the speci…cation refered to in the tables and …gures as the full model. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient of in ‡ation, ; in the full model (but not output) is senstive to small changes in : As goes from 1 to 1.1, goes from about .6 to .8. This sensitivity to is much less acute in the absence of habits. Nonetheless higher values of deliver bigger as well as less investment volatility. If is too high it is impossible to generate enough volatility in investment even without adjustment costs. Therefore for the benchmark model without learning or habits, is chosen so that the model is able to deliver the correct relative volatility of investment . This value ( = 4) is kept constant in all other cases without habits. In all cases, the investment adjustment cost parameter, v; is set to keep the ratio of the standard deviation of investment and output equal to their value in the US data.
Following Cooper and Johri (2002) , ; the discount factor is set to :984 while ; the depreciation rate is set to :02, the value estimated in Johri and Letendre (2007) . The parameter is chosen in all models to maintain a steady state markup of 5%.
Turning to the speci…cation of technology, intermediate goods producers are assumed to use a Cobb Douglas production function to produce output, given by
while the accumulation equation for organizational capital is
The elasticity of output w.r.t. physical capital is set to .39 to deliver a capital output ratio of 10.24 and is chosen to maintain constant returns in the benchmark model without learning-by-doing. Turning to the parameters associated with learning-by-doing, I set the elasticity of output with respect to organizational capital, " = 0:16 in the speci…cation referred to as full model. This value corresponds to a "learning rate" of just under twelve percent and is taken from 4-digit level production function estimates for US manufacturing industries provided in Cooper and Johri. 12 This is approximately the same value used by Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) in their study on organizational capital. Sensitivity analysis is conducted with a …fteen percent learning rule. Note that these learning rates are much lower than commonly estimated in microeconomic studies in the traditional learning-by-doing literature. The "consensus" estimate based on an extensive list of industries over the past hundred or so years appears to be twenty percent learning. See Irwin and Klenow (1994) for estimates in the semi-conductor industry as well as a discussion of past studies. Note that these studies impose quite strong restrictions on the accumulation of organizational capital which is governed by
In particular, note that each unit of past output contributes equally (a value of unity) to the accumulation of H(t+1) through H(t) no matter how long ago it was produced. To the extent that knowledge gleaned from past production is either lost to the …rm because of labour turnover or re-organizations or becomes increasingly irrelevant over time, imposing a value of unity on the contribution of H(t) seems overly restrictive. Both Benkard (2000) and Cooper and Johri (2002) drop this restriction. Benkard shows that allowing for "organizational forgetting"leads to higher estimates of the learning rate. For example in his work on aircraft production, the estimated learning rate rises from roughly 20 percent to 39 percent once "organizational forgetting" is allowed. Keeping this in mind, and the even higher estimate of " = .49 for the aggregate economy in Cooper-Johri (2002) , suggests that the amount of learning-by-doing built into the model is fairly conservative.
I set = :55 and = 1 which are the values that correspond to " = :16; in the estimates reported by Cooper and Johri. The persistence in the growth rate of money was set to .57, taken from Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000).
Results

Some Analytical Results
In this section, we present some analytical results regarding the dynamics of prices implied by the learning e¤ects introduced in this paper and compare them to some well known models in the sticky price literature. As is usual, I make some simpli…cations in order to solve the model analytically. I assume that there is no physical capital in the economy and impose a static money demand equation instead of (21): Habit formation in leisure is also ignored.
The key equation that governs the dynamics of prices emerges from the maximization problem of intermediate goods …rms who solve the following problem.
subject to (3) and (29) . For our purposes, it is useful to substitute the input demand function (3) in (29) and derive an expression for P i ; the input price set by the ith …rm:
Note that the joint implication of a downward sloping demand curve and the accumulation equation for organizational capital is that prices are decreasing in H(s t ) and increasing in P (s t ); Y (s t ) and H(s t 1 ). While I have discussed the reasons why prices must be reduced in order to speed up the accumulation of organizational capital, it is worth explaining why prices are increasing in H(s t 1 ); the current level of organizational capital. The accumulation technology (29) implies that additional units of organizational capital today increase the ability of the …rm to learn, leading to more organizational capital tomorrow. As a result of this improved e¢ ciency in learning, less needs to be produced today in order to achieve any target level of organizational capital tomorrow. Given downward sloping demand curves facing …rms, this implies that prices can be higher.
Assuming no capital, (28) implies
Replacing (31) and (32) in (30) and maximizing over H(s t ) yields an e¢ -ciency condition for the ith intermediate goods …rm which is the equivalent of combining (13) and (14): our dynamic pricing equation. Rearranging yields the following expression:
Using symmetry in equilibrium gives us :
for all states. Linearizing (33) around the deterministic steady state, and assuming that = = 1 and using (22) to substitute out Q we get:
where
is only a function of the three key learning-bydoing parameters. Here b w t ; c H t ; b P t ;and b Y t ; represent percent deviations from steady state for w(s t ); H(s t 1 ); P (s t ) and Y (s t ) respectively and E refers to the expectation at t 1. It is useful to compare this expression to the corresponding expression when no learning e¤ects are present:
which tells us that …rms would change prices by the expected change in nominal wage rate.
The static money demand equation implies that c
Given the preferences in (27) , we can use (20) and market clearing conditions to obtain the following expression:
where = (N=1 N )%. In this expression, N denotes steady state hours and % is the elasticity of the marginal utility of leisure w.r.t. leisure. Note that in the absence of learning-by-doing, the expression would reduce to Chari et al (2000) . Linearizing (29) gives us the following expression
where L is the lag operator. (37) can then be used to replace c H t and d H t+1 while b w t can be replaced using (36) in (34) . Now …rst simplify the resulting expression by noting that R 1 (1 ( + ) = 1
, and then multiplying through by 1 L; and applying the lag operator as appropriate we get our expression for output and …nally replacing b Y t with c M t b P t we get the expression for prices:
Comparing this expression to the equivalent expression for a two-period staggered price setting problem without learning-by-doing (taken from Chari et al in 39 below) reveals that the two equations have a similar second order di¤erence equation structure. Apart from key di¤erences in coe¢ cients, which I discuss below, note also that learning-by-doing involves not only a lead in the exogenous money process but also a lag which is missing in the absence of learning e¤ects.
For our preferences it is easy to check that is decreasing in and in : Chari et al show that the dynamics of their system is controlled by : also plays an important role here. While the absolute magnitude of d 1 ; d 2 ;and d 3 are all increasing in ; for our parameterizations these are negative numbers. As a result all three are decreasing in : The dynamics of the system depends on 1 ; the stable root of the characteristic quadratic associated with (38) where
Given the values of other parameters, it is decreasing in and increasing in : The stable root, 1 ; also depends on the learning by doing parameters. While it is increasing in all three parameters:
; and ;note that it is relatively more sensitive to small changes in than the other two parameters. The degree of sensitivity is increasing in : Figure  1 plots the sensitivity of 1 to these parameters.
The results of this section suggest that learning-by-doing plays an important role in increasing the inertia of the price level. Equation (38) suggests that one-period price-setting behaviour by …rms mimics a two-period staggered price setting environment as in Taylor (1980) with some additional dynamics coming from the lagged money shock term. From a quantitative perspective though, the key to matching the degree of inertia seen in the data, is the value of 1 : Chari et al. argue that structural restrictions placed on ; prevent their model from generating much inertia in either in ‡ation or aggregate output. In Chari et al., 1 must be negative whereas, like Taylor (who treated it as a free parameter), values of 1 calculated in the learning-by-doing model are positive and lie between zero and unity. From the perspective of this argument, learning-by-doing succeeds in generating realistic levels of inertia because the additional learning parameters break the tight link between 1 and seen in Chari et al. While, the results of this section are instructive, they are based on unrealistic restrictions which I drop in the next section.
Dynamics in the full model
The main question addressed in this section is how much additional inertia in the aggregate price level is generated by adding learning-by-doing and habits in leisure to the benchmark one period sticky price model when the economy is hit by money growth shocks. I also discuss how these mechanisms in ‡uence the persistence of aggregate output movements. I begin with a discussion of the auto-correlation between in ‡ation and its …rst lag ( ) as well as output and its …rst lag ( y ). I then discuss the model generated impulse response of key variables to a one percent increase in the growth rate of money.
13 Table 1 reports the …rst order auto-correlation coe¢ cients of in ‡ation and output for various models. Row 1 of the table corresponds to the benchmark model. In the absence of learning-by-doing and habits the one-period sticky price model delivers negligible persistence in in ‡ation and output. The actual values are = :015 and y = :013: Row 2 reports corresponding moments for the full model. Both mechanisms are operational in this speci…cation which has a learning rate of 12 percent and a moderate level of habit formation (b = :65). There is a dramatic increase in in ‡ation inertia and persistence in aggregate output relative to row 1. The corresponding auto-correlation coe¢ cients rise to = :808 and y = :707: This compares favourably to the actual moments for US data reported in row 7 which are = :82 and y = :93 respectively. Rows 3-6 attempt to disentangle the contribution of the two mechanisms and provide some sensitivity analysis. Rows 3 and 4 investigate models with only learning e¤ects but no habits while rows 5 and 6 vary the habits parameter, b; in the absence of learning-by-doing. Rows 3 and 4 show that learning-by-doing can account for a signi…cant proportion of in ‡ation and output inertia ranging from roughly one-third with 12 percent learning rates to roughly one-half with 15 percent learning rates. Rows 5 and 6 show that on its own, habit formation does better at accounting for in ‡ation inertia and roughly as well at accounting for output persistence. Figure 2 compares the impulse response of in ‡ation between the full model and the benchmark sticky price model. Both models recieve a persistent but unexpected one percent increase in the growth rate of money. Since …rms cannot respond to a money shock surprise within the period, in ‡ation is unchanged in the period of the shock. In the absence of learning or habits, …rms raise prices by just over 2 percent in the period after the shock. The response of prices is much more muted in the full model, rising by roughly .3 percent in period 2. The contrast between the two models is also stark in period 3. While in the benchmark model, in ‡ation is almost back to steady state levels, it rises to .65 percent in the full model and then slowly retreats back to steady state in the periods after.
The full model generates considerably more in ‡ation inertia for two reasons. First, due to the presence of learning-by-doing and habit formation, marginal costs rise very slowly. Second, …rms may wish to take advantage of the high demand for their product to learn, and therefore raise prices by less than the increase in marginal cost. In other words, …rms may lower their markups. These two e¤ects can be seen in Figures 3a and 3b. Figure 3a plots the response of nominal marginal cost in the benchmark and full model in the periods after the shock occurs. These variables are normalized by the money supply so that if costs were to rise in proportion to the money supply, the response would be zero. The behaviour of costs in the two models is quite di¤erent. In the benchmark model, nominal costs increase faster than money supply while in the full model, nominal costs increase slower than the money supply. Figure 3b plots the additional in ‡uence on price inertia exerted by time-varying markups. We see that …rms lower their markup below steady state levels in the periods immediately after the shock occurs. As organizational capital is accumulated, it's marginal value falls so that after three periods …rms …nd it more pro…table to raise markups slightly. A glance at Figures 3a and 3b sugest that the impact of marginal costs on price inertia is larger than that of declining markups. Figure 4 reports the response of output, consumption, investment and hours for the benchmark and full models. In the absence of the two propagation mechanisms, all four variables jump up in the impact period and thereafter fall back to essentially steady state levels. The presence of learningby-doing and habit formation lead to much longer drawn out responses as expected. Hours are above steady state for fourteen quarters while output is above steady state for over thirty quarters. Since the capital stock is predetermined and prices cannot be changed, …rms must meet the increase in demand for their products by hiring more labour. Consumers respond to the increase in income by consuming and investing more. Since prices are …xed in the impact period, the impulse responses are similar in the two models with slightly bigger spikes in the full model. Once prices can respond to the increase in money, …rms sharply increase their prices in period 2 in the benchmark model but much less so in the full model. This causes a sharp fall in real money balances in the benchmark model and therefore in the demand for intermediate and …nal goods. As a result, in the quarter after the shock, output, hours and investment are virtually back to their steady state levels.
Due to a slight increase in the capital stock, output is slightly above steady state levels and hours are a touch below steady state levels. Since the rise in prices is muted in the full model, the fall in real variables is also muted and elongated. The presence of learning by doing also implies that the initial spike in production leads to the accumulation of organizational capital which raises …rm-level productivity in period 2. This directly leads to more production. Moreover, the higher productivity means that each …rm's labour demand curve shifts outwards leading to more labour being hired in period 2 than in the benchmark model. This e¤ect is strengthened by the habit formation process. The initial spike in hours worked leads to a fall in the marginal utility of leisure in period 2 for any level of period 2 hours. This means consumers are more willing to work at any given wage rate.
What justi…es the higher production by …rms in the periods subsequent to the shock in the full model? Recall that in the presence of learning e¤ects, …rms choose not to increase prices by the full increase in money. As a result, real money balances with consumers remain above steady state levels for long periods of time and consequently demand for …nal and intermediate goods remains high.
Business cycle moments
In this section I brie ‡y ask if the improvements in the ability of the full model to generate price inertia come at the expense of performance on other fronts. Some evidence that this is not the case emerges from the impulse response analysis above. Further evidence can be gleaned by looking at a standard set of business cycle moments for the benchmark and full model relative to aggregate US data.
14 Table 2 reports un…ltered theoretical second moments for the benchmark and full model in rows 1 and 2 respectively. The corresponding moments for log-linearly detrended US data (taken from Cooper and Johri (2002) ) are reported in the last row. In all cases the money shock has a standard deviation of .00498 which is the value used in Nelson (1998) . Looking across the rows of table 3, all the models do a good job of capturing the basic features of business cycles. Consumption, hours and investment are all procyclical and there is evidence of consumption smoothing. The two models also inherit some common problems: in all cases consumption is more volatile than in the US data and too highly correlated with output. In fact the behaviour of consumption is virtually identical in the two models. Similarly, investment is too highly correlated with output in both models relative to the data. The …rst clear di¤erences across models appear when we study the behaviour of hours. The benchmark model generates too much relative volatility compared to the data. The full model in row 2 lowers the relative volatility of hours from 1.66 to 1.34 which is still too high relative to US data. It also lowers the correlation between hours and output bringing it closer to the data.
Conclusions
Learning-by-doing and habit formation in leisure is introduced into a monetary dynamic general equilibrium model. In order to highlight the ability of the model to generate inertia in the aggregate price level, all other sources of inertia commonly used in the literature such as menu costs, staggered price or wage contracts are ignored. The model therefore relies on the minimal amount of price stickiness needed: prices are chosen before the shocks occur. A calibrated version of the model generates considerable inertia in both in ‡a-tion and output dynamics in response to money growth shocks. The model also does reasonably well in matching moments that capture key features of the US business cycle. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30 Full model Benchmark model 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30 Benchmark model Full model 4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30 Full model Benchmark model 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30 Full model Benchmark model
